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“Someone may ask, “What is the difference, then, between moral philosophy and
moral psychology?” The answer may be that there is no interesting difference and
that the issue is of interest only to university administrators.”1

In “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (1891),” William James provides
a rough taxonomy of the state of ethical philosophy at the time that he is writing. Making a
division between psychological approaches that identify the good with the feeling of
pleasure derived by a naturally evolved organism and metaphysical approaches which hold
that the good is conceptual, James argues that both are equally goods and that they each
imply similar obligation. 2 James’ solution, therefore, to the problem of which type of good
must be honored is the pragmatist one: both are seen to have an effect on the organism and
are thus equally real. Both are therefore equally worthy of consideration and respect.
Today, it may be harder to make the same kind of sweeping survey of the state
of ethics and to solve the problem of casuistry in one stroke. In some department,
somewhere, every type of moral philosophy is actively defended. However, for almost four
decades, the “brain-borne” or metaphysical approach to ethics has been dominant in
academic philosophy and the evolutionary psychological understanding of happiness has
played a secondary role. Now, deontologists, contractarians, utilitarians, experimental
philosophers, and many virtue theorists work on how to conceptualize the good properly.
Meanwhile, evolutionary moral psychologists have taken up the other part of James’ project,
but with little of his concern as a moral philosopher about finding how to achieve the most
good. Instead, these scientists look to clues in our own and in other species’ development in
order to determine why we perceive certain activities and actions to be good (e.g. caring for
others) and others bad (e.g. cheating on exams).
The question this paper for the American Philosophies Forum takes up is that of
whether Ethics as a discipline has something to learn from the literature in evolutionary
moral psychology and if this mode of explanation should be part of its future. Its primary

Harman, Gilbert. 2003. Three trends in moral and political philosophy. Journal of Value Inquiry 37, (3) :
415-420.
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thesis is that Ethics does have much to learn because the sciences that study the evolutionary
mechanisms by which ethical judgments are produced will allow us, in a naturalist and
pragmatist fashion, to better understand the possibilities for achieving our ethical goals.
They will do so not because they demonstrate that all effective and achievable moralities
must be anchored in evolutionarily derived moral faculties or intuitions, but because these
sciences can help to reveal the means by which our culturally derived ethical ideals might be
realized as well as indicate the innate psychological and psycho-social stumbling blocks and
hurdles to these ideals’ realization.
In “The Moral Philosophy and the Moral Life,” James proves a keen
diagnostician of the aim of moral philosophers as well as a keen analyst of the main
questions to which moral philosophy must find answers if it is to be successful. Regarding
the goal of moral philosophy, he notes that it aims “to find an account of the moral relations
that obtain among things, which will weave them into the unity of a stable system, and make
of the world…a genuine universe from the ethical point of view.3 In order to construct such
a system, James notes that the moral philosopher must answer questions about the
psychological origin of our moral judgments, about the meaning of our primary ethical
terms such as good and obligation, and about how to rank competing goods and duties in
order that we may act correctly.4 In order to assess the importance of evolutionary moral
psychology for moral philosophy, this paper will primarily be concerned with what James
call the origin question . However, the semantic and casuistic questions will be returned to
when this paper argues that evolutionarily derived moral sentiments mean something
different than do second-order moral sentiments and that the latter should be given primacy
over the former.
In attempting to answer the question about the psychological origin of our moral
ideas, James notes that there are two main schools of thought on this matter. These he terms
the “evolutionist” and the “intuitionist.” Cited as his primary example of the evolutionist
school is utilitarianism as it was developed by the J.S. Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and
Alexander Bain. Utilitarians, he maintains, attempt “to explain all our sentiments and
preferences” by showing how “our human ideals…must have arisen from the association
3
4
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with acts of simple bodily pleasures and reliefs from pain.”5 Though James agrees that
associationist psychology can account for many of our sentiments, he argues that there are
preferences for which the evolutionary moral psychology of his day cannot account. At the
base level, these include psychosomatic reactions like our tendency “to faint at the sight of
blood” as well as socio-psychological affects like our “passion for poetry.” At more
exclusively cognitive levels—such as when we think it wrong for a romantic couple with a
troubled history to reunite—these include the preference for others to follow certain norms
for social behavior even when that social behavior has no effect on the judging individual’s
happiness. At the highest level, the preferences for which associationist psychology cannot
account include our ideals and aspirations for cultural change and direction.6 All of these
emotions, intuitions, and ideals, James maintains, are the result of “secondary affections,”
feelings that have their origin in “incidental complications to our cerebral structure, a
structure whose features arose with no reference to the perception of such discords and
harmonies as [association and utility].”7 In other words and according to James, there exists
a class of moral sentiments which supervene upon and are qualitatively different from those
which are a product of our association with objects and processes that cause us to
experience pleasure or pain.
The existence of these secondary, supervenient or, to use James’ terms, “brainborne” or “intuitive” preferences presents a real problem for the philosopher who aims to
“furnish an account of the moral relations that obtain among things.” This is because the
moral universe is not a universe but a pluriverse; it consists of at least two types of moral
sentiments: those which function to preserve the human organism and to bring it pleasure
and those that inform our preferences and our ideals but which have no such evolutionarily
attributable function. Acknowledging that both types of moral sentiments exist and wishing
to give each type its due as being a real preference expressed by a living individual, James
proposes in “The Moral Philosophy and the Moral Life” that neither be given priority in
terms of moral reasoning and that only the common and salient feature of each (that they

James 2000, 204.
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both indicate a preference) be included in the calculations of a moral philosopher concerned
with envisioning a world where the most good may be realized.8
James’ suggestion of a compromise position between the evolutionist and
intuitionist approaches to moral philosophy is an unusual position in both modern and
contemporary philosophy where, more often than not, philosophers have privileged one type
of sentiment over another and have also given reasons why the one is superior to the other in
terms of the way in which it does or does not satisfy a general moral principle. What’s more,
though novel, his solution is deeply unsatisfying, for it leaves us with both a moral dualism
and a mystery. The dualism is between (a) those moral sentiments that function to preserve
the human organism; and (b) those moral sentiments that equally inform our preferences and
our ideals but have no such evolutionarily attributable function. Though he hints at a
secondary psychological process by which intuitive moral sentiments are created (the
“incidental complications to our cerebral structure” mentioned above), the mystery is how
and why a pleasure seeking organism whose aim is reproduction should come to have moral
judgments (informed by moral sentiments) such as “Corporations should not have the same
free speech rights as human beings” or “A kid should never rat on another kid.” Further,
with this dualism, the casuistic question is raised of which type of moral sentiment should
be given primacy in ethical decision making, a question that James sidesteps by assigning
them equal worth based on their both being psychological preferences held by concrete
individuals.9
How to answer this question, to overcome this dualism, and to solve this
mystery? The remainder of this paper will argue that a nuanced and thoroughgoing
naturalism may allow us to accomplish all three of these things. First, such a naturalism
answers the question of which type of moral sentiment should be given primacy by
indicating why intuitionist sentiments need to be respected in a way in which evolutionarily
derived sentiments do not. Second, it solves the puzzle and overcomes the dualism by
providing us with a materialist explanation of how natural, evolutionary processes came to
generate these secondary moral sentiments. In order to make these points and to set up this
paper’s overall argument that Ethics has much to learn from evolutionary moral psychology
8
9
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and that a consideration of this literature should be included in future theorizing about value,
it is first necessary to define evolutionary moral psychology. After that, it will be possible to
deal with the main philosophical challenges to evolutionary moral psychology’s relevancy
to the discipline of philosophical ethics. This accomplished, the paper will proceed to show
how the naturalistic account of the origin of our moral sentiments and intuitions solves the
mystery of where our moral judgments come from and overcomes the dualism between
primary and secondary moral preferences. In the course of these explanations, the question
of which type of moral sentiment should be given primacy in our ethical decision making
will be answered.
Thus far, and in order to introduce the problem of the role that evolutionary
moral psychology should play in our moral philosophy, this paper has been using
utilitarianism and the psychological theory which supports it, associationism, as an example
of an evolutionarily based moral psychology. Though useful for setting up the distinction
between evolutionarily derived moral sentiments and moral sentiments which cannot be so
derived, late 19th century associationist psychology is not a good representation of
contemporary evolutionary moral psychology. While the theory is still widely held that
evolution predisposes us to prefer states that bring pleasure rather than pain, many more
predispositions have been suggested including that to rape, to avoid incest, to prefer
cleanliness, to show deference, to be compassionate, etc.10 What each of the accounts of the
genesis of these moral sentimental predispositions includes is the supposition that each
sentiment somehow and for an evolutionarily meaningful amount of time conferred a
survival advantage on the members of our species that possessed it and that it was therefore
passed on.11
Many of these accounts have suggested that evolutionary pressures have been
sufficient to generate not only moral predispositions, but many of our moral intuitions as
well.12 To take one example, a group of evolutionary psychologists has argued that the
Haidt, Jonathan, & Craig Joseph. 2004. Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate
Culturally Variable Virtues. Daedalus Special Issue on human nature: 59. Also see Hamilton, Richard.
2008. The darwinian cage: Evolutionary psychology as moral science. Theory, Culture & Society 25, (2)
(03) : 110.
11
Ruse, Michael. “Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach” pages 223-256 in Evolutionary
Naturalism. London: Routledge, 1995.
12
Haidt & Joseph 2004.
10
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universal intuition that incest is wrong resulted from an evolutionary pressure “to inhibit sex
among reproductively mature close genetic relatives because children produced by these
unions would be less healthy.”13 The vehicle for this inhibition, they claim, is a specialized
psychological circuit or module which takes “certain cues as input that were reliably
correlated with genetic relatedness ancestrally”14 and combines these with an innate
psychological predisposition against having sexual relations with these people. Such cues
include living in the same domicile together from a young age and for extended periods of
time and—when combined with the psychological predisposition—result in the moral
intuition that incest is wrong.15 Developed to explain a broader range of moral judgments
and actions and also much more voluminous is the evolutionary psychological research into
altruism. Using methodologies such as game theory, comparative primatology, and
statistical comparative analysis of evolutionary success rates, this body of evidence strongly
suggests that humans share with other animals the tendency to be “social, cooperative, and
even altruistic under certain circumstances.”16
It is with these and similar claims to the effect that evolutionary pressures are
generative of moral judgments that many moral philosophers and especially those who
consider themselves moral realists challenge evolutionary psychology’s claim to making a
contribution to moral philosophy.17 Though most grant that evolutionary theory may
provide explanations for why we instinctively act in certain ways or have predictable
affective and cognitive reactions to certain states of affairs, they do not believe that the
judgments thus engendered have anything to do with our morality. Rather, they argue that
there is a qualitative difference between our moral judgments about what is good and bad
and those things we tend to prefer of shun due to our native affective constitutions. As
Virginia Held writes, the

Lieberman, Debra, John Tooby & Leda Cosmides. 2003. Does morality have a biological basis? An
empirical test of the factors governing moral sentiments relating to incest. Proceedings of the Royal Society
London (Biological Sciences), 270(1517) : 820.
14
Leiberman et al 2003 : 821.
15
Leiberman et al 2003 : 822-26.
16
Curry, Oliver. 2006. Who's afraid of the naturalistic fallacy? Evolutionary Psychology 4: 235.
17
This is a summary of the philosopher’s arguments in De Waal, Franz 2006 Primates and Philosophy,
Princeton, Princeton University Press. (particularly Korsgaard?) against EMP, publishable draft to cite
these arguments and work more closely with them.
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conscious awareness of moral choice has trouble fitting into the causal order
of the world of scientific naturalism [that informs the evolutionary
psychological perspective]. Not only can it perhaps not be fully explained by
any science without being explained away; more importantly, explanation is
characteristically not what we look for when we consider choosing one course
of action and not another, or when we deliberate about one interpretation of
what we are doing instead of another. What we characteristically seek is
justification rather than explanation, evaluation rather than description, the
normative rather than the natural.18
When we think through examples, this qualitative distinction makes sense.
Though it may be the case that some of these evolutionarily derived moral sentiments track
the real good (for example, when we are revolted at seeing home-made videos of homeless
people being set on fire by bored adolescents), there is no necessary relation between the
two. This is suggested by the fact that we can also think of evolutionarily derived moral
judgments—like that of disgust when we see people with different dietary and hygienic
regimes than those to which we are accustomed—that do not square with our ideas about the
moral equality of human beings. Just because we have these native moral sentiments, does
not mean that we judge them to be good. Rather, they are judged to be good or bad by some
other measure (like their accordance with virtue, because they follow from a principle,
because God commanded or forbade such a thought or act, etc.).
Employed but not made explicit here in this distinction between proper,
evaluative moral judgments and evolutionary moral psychological judgments is the
naturalistic fallacy. This fallacy as it was variously theorized by David Hume in A Treatise
of Human Nature (1740) and G. E. Moore in his Principia Ethica (1903) has supported
many philosophers’ claims that ethics has nothing to learn about the good from evolutionary
moral psychology.19 For their part, many evolutionary moral psychologist’s have also held
to this distinction because the separation between the natural and the ethical spheres that it
underwrites allows them to investigate such questions as innate racism and whether the male
of our species has an evolved tendency to rape (and women to resist) without dealing with
whether these activities are truly moral or not. As scientists and naturalists, they claim, they
Held, Virginia. 2002. Moral subjects: The natural and the normative. Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 76, (2) (Nov.): 7-24.
19
Go through literature for published paper, cite Held 2002 and Stanford Encyclopedia article article on
moral anti-naturalism literature
18
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are just dealing with the evidence for or against these social adaptations and not whether
they are moral or immoral.
In its Humean version, the naturalist fallacy supports the distinction between
distinction between proper, evaluative moral judgments and evolutionarily derived
judgments by pointing out that it is illegitimate to move from a claim about the way
something is, to a claim about the way it ought to be.20 In other words, because values “are
not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind,”21 one cannot “make logical inferences
of value from observations of natural facts”22 To illustrate this fallacy with an example,
from the empirical claim that “there are less species of frogs in the Northeastern United
States today than there were forty years ago,” one cannot logically proceed to the perceptual
claim that “there ought to be a greater variety of frogs in the Northeast.” In order to make
this move, one needs to combine it with an ethical claim such as “It is good for the
environment in the Northeast that there be a large variety of frogs within it.” To give
another example, and one more germane to the topic at hand, just because humans (along
with other primates)23 have an evolutionally derived tendency to punish cheating and even
to judge it to be wrong, this does not mean that cheating is wrong.
Though often confused with Hume’s, Moore’s iteration of the naturalistic
fallacy is somewhat distinct and is based upon the semantic content of judgments of value
rather than on the distinction between is and ought. According to Moore, it is fallacious to
identify “the good” with its object (such as when we say “Good dog, thanks for my
slippers,”) because it is possible to conceive of “the good” separately from my dog, or from
any other object or its properties to which we attribute the quality of being good. The Good,
Moore claims, is not definable, it is a simple concept and it cannot be known it terms of the
objects to which it pertains.24 To try to define the good (or the bad) in terms of the
properties of natural objects is, according to Moore, to commit the naturalistic fallacy.
Taking up again the example used in the previous paragraph, just because humans tend to
Hume, David. 1740 Treatise of Human Nature (1740). As cited in Teehan, John, and Christopher
diCarlo. 2004. On the naturalistic fallacy: A conceptual basis for evolutionary ethics. Evolutionary
Psychology 2 : 34
21
Hume, David. 1740 Treatise of Human Nature (1739). As cited in Curry 2006 : 238
22
Teehan & diCarlo 2004 : 34
23
De Waal or other literature to support this point.
24
Teehan & diCarlo 35
20
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call cheating bad, does not explain why cheating is morally bad. To do that, we would have
to have a definition of “the bad.” However, as a simple concept, no such definition is
available. This does not mean that evolutionary psychological research cannot explain why
we believe cheating to be bad, only that it cannot voice an opinion on whether cheating is
really bad or not. For instance, an evolutionary psychologist might hypothesize that cheaters
were not reliable partners in complex cooperative behaviors needed for a group’s survival
and that those who cheat therefore came to be instinctively judged to be bad. However,
because these are all claims about natural objects and their relations and not about what the
good is in-itself, they do not violate the naturalistic fallacy.
While the naturalistic fallacy in both its Humean and Moorean versions gives
philosophers logical reasons to doubt that we can learn anything about morality from
evolutionary psychology, the history of the science seems to provide additional reasons to
doubt its ability to help us identify the good. This is because, when viewed with a historical
lens and also when examining some of its contemporary claims, the moral philosophy which
evolutionary psychologists believe to be “natural” often does not accord at all with our
moral intuitions about the good. To take one widely recognized example and one that comes
from the origins of this science, Herbert Spencer in his attempt to develop an evolutionary
moral science posited that, for the most happiness, “the welfare of humanity at large will be
achieved by the prosperity and spread of the best varieties [of the human race],”25 and that
other varieties should be allowed to die out. To take another example from the history of
moral psychology, the science of eugenics as it was developed in the 1920s and 1930s
identified the good with a certain view of evolutionary fitness and took active steps
including the sterilization and the murder of unfit individuals in order to advance this end.26
Though examples of claims that run so counter to our moral intuitions about the good are
difficult (if not at impossible27) to find in the contemporary literature, the sheer variety of
native moral sentiments and their accompanying intuitions that have been found and the fact
that only some of them (e.g. the empathic sentiment evoked by the suffering of others,
Spencer, Herbert. 1897. Principles of Ethics. New York: Appleton & Company, 222.
need reference
27
See Rushton, J. Phillippe & Glayde Whitney. 2002. Cross-National Variation in Violent Crime Rates:
Race, r-K Theory and Income. Population and Environment 23:6 as well as Levin, M. 1984. Why
Homosexuality is Abnormal. Monist 67: 251-83 for examples.
25
26
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cheater detection, etc.) correspond to our ideas about virtue while others (e.g. innate
tendencies to stereotype groups) indicate that there is no necessary and direct
correspondence between our evolved moral sentiments and moral truth.
When one adds the non-relevance of natural facts to moral philosophy
suggested by the naturalistic fallacy to the non-correspondence of evolutionarily produced
moral sentiments with what we take to be moral truths, there seems to be ample reason to
doubt that naturalism in general and evolutionary moral psychology in particular can ever
provide us with insights into what we should do. In the main, this paper is in agreement with
the many philosophers who make this claim and, therefore, it concludes that it is secondary
or “brain-borne” moral sentiments and judgments about the good that should be given
primacy in discussions about what we ought to do. This is because most of us would not
want to live in a world where the proof of one’s virtue is the ability to pass on one’s genes
and where the urges, inclinations, and preferences we have evolved to allow this
transmission are judged to be the only right ones. That said, there are still good reasons for
moral philosophers to pay close attention to the results of evolutionary moral psychology.
First, because it can provide us with an account of the way in which we come to have moral
dispositions and second, because it can provide us with a compendium of these dispositions.
Finally, it may also explain why we sometimes have conflicting ideas about the good, as
well as give us insights about how we might go about achieving the goods that we hold in
common. In short, and to quote a 2004 essay that appeared in Evolutionary Psychology by
John Teehan and Christopher DiCarlo: “Any science that which helps us to understand and
assess morally problematic situations has something to contribute to moral philosophy.”28
Evolutionary moral psychology is such a science and the remainder of this paper will be
devoted to showing how it makes these contributions.
The increasingly sophisticated account of the development of complex or
secondary moral intuitions that evolutionary moral psychology is in the course of providing
is one that solves the mystery James left us with in “The Moral Philosophy and the Moral
Life” of how we come to have moral intuitions that differ from those for which we can
discover an evolutionary explanation. At first glance, any such account seems problematic

28
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and unlikely, for why would evolutionary pressures ever select for cognitive intuitions about
the good rather than just select for affectively triggered reactions to certain environmental or
social stimuli? For example, if protecting one’s mate from other potential suitors conferred
an evolutionary advantage on an individual, then it would make sense that the affect of
jealousy is triggered when Colin Farrell sidles up next to your mate at a bar and lights her
cigarette. Though at that point the game is usually lost, you would at least be motivated to
fend off his advance in order have a chance at passing on your genes with the help of the
partner you have selected for her reproductive fitness. If passing on one’s genes is all that
matters to evolution, then affectively motivated action is sufficient for this purpose;29 the
affect of jealousy does not have to be accompanied by the thought “mate stealing is wrong”
in order for the evolutionary goal that the moral sentiment aims at to be realized.
Nonetheless, we find ourselves as products of evolution who have intuitions not
only about the viciousness of mate stealing, but also about how murder is wrong, how the
American education system does a disservice to its youth, and about how needless suffering
is to be avoided. Given the logic of evolution, there are at least three possibilities for how
this came to be. One is that these intuitions have an evolutionary utility and confer some
advantage on those beings that possess it. The second is that these intuitions serve no
adaptive purpose and are merely by-products of other successful adaptations. For instance, it
could be the case that an evolutionary advantage was conferred upon individuals who could
generalize about objects and their experience in the natural world and that this cognitive
ability was then applied to the categorization of affective states despite the fact that this act
of combination and reflection conveyed no evolutionary advantage. The third possibility is
that all both of these stories are somewhat true and that intuitions have an evolutionary
utility and confer some advantage on those beings who possess it, but that they also came
about partly by chance or for some other reason and that they do not always confer an
evolutionary advantage (and may sometimes even be evolutionarily disadvantageous).
Though the second possibility would be an interesting to investigate, the fact
that these intuitions have endured gives us reason to suspect that our moral intuitions confer
some real advantage that purely affective means of behavioral control do not (and thuse that

29
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option one or three is the case). The chief candidate for the advantage that moral intuitions
confer is the production and communication of social norms which are advantageous to the
cooperation and survival of some group. However, the question of supervenience, or of how
moral sentiments become intuitions, still needs an explanation. In their 2004 article “Why
Moore’s Open Question is Open: The Evolution of Moral Supervenience,” Richmond
Campbell and Jennifer Woodrow provide a plausible, naturalistic account of how moral
intuitions or James’ “secondary preferences” can be explained as the cumulative results of
selection pressures that tend to favor cooperative groups. They also provide an explanation
for how these selections pressures can come to create creatures like us who often have
conflicting opinions about the good and sometimes ask questions about why we should
pursue certain goods. In the developmental narrative that they give, Campbell and Woodrow
start with the example of chimpanzees that can “learn…to share foliage from trees when it is
neither so abundant nor so scarce that it makes sharing useless.”30 Though the chimps may
not be aware of it, there is a reason for sharing food (it allows them to survive and pass on
more of their genes). Therefore, those chimpanzees who can communicate by signs of
approbation and disapprobation that food sharing in circumstances of relevant abundance is
the correct behavior to follow will tend to have more offspring than those who do not have
the faculties to communicate this message or to internalize it as a preference.
The world, however, does not always stay the same and when food supplies
change or other animals compete for food resources, those animals that are inflexible in
terms of what norms they can communicate or adopt do not survive. Thus evolution would
tend to favor those animals whose norms are somewhat plastic and who can more or less
rapidly develop and diffuse new norms and abandon ones that are less useful.31 Language
itself, they argue, partly “arises along with and because of the capacity to recognize and
respond to patterns of normative consistency and inconsistency”32 and it allows those
creatures that develop it to communicate norms appropriate to the situation much more
readily. Knowing that some type of action is a good or a bad thing therefore confers
advantages because it allows for sophisticated and subtle cooperative actions. For the reason
Campbell, Richmond, and Jennifer Woodrow. 2003. Why moore's open question is open: The evolution
of moral supervenience. Journal of Value Inquiry 37, (3): 354.
31
Campbell and Woodrow 2003 : 356-57
32
Campbell and Woodrow 2003 : 361
30
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that social and environmental situations change, it is also good to have the ability to
question why some action or state of affairs is a good thing, to debate it, and to
communicate a new norm if the old social intuition no longer fulfills its function. Creatures
with these abilities look a lot like us.
However, even after we have undergone a secondary process of social
evolution, we are also still those creatures that, for most of our history, evolved to survive
and to pass on our genes in a social, economic, and natural world far different to the world
that we live in today. Though this paper has argued that moral intuitions (or what we can
now equally call social norms) deserve to be respected in a way that evolutionarily derived
moral sentiments do not, this rough casuistry is little help when it comes to actually deciding
what the good is and how it should be pursued. It is little help because we cannot always tell
the difference between the two types of sentiments and because these cultural intuitions
have themselves evolved to respond to specific socio-economic and environmental
situations. Further, they remain part of our intuitive arsenal even when they have outlived
their usefulness and other, different and competing norms have moved into take their place.
Nonetheless, each of these demands is equally felt and we are contradictorily pulled. As
Teehan and DiCarlo put it
While the universe is value-neutral in the sense of not entailing any moral
imperatives, it does contain the conditions that give rise to valuing and to
creatures who make value judgments. These value judgments are not the
expression of some pre-existing moral essence but rather arise from the
complex interactions between individuals and the environment. In effect,
morality is not “out there” waiting to be found, it is constructed by
individuals-who-value, who live in an environment which provides the
conditions for both satisfying and frustrating our desires, and who must live
with others who may or may not value the same things, in the same way.
Morality is both the result of and a contributor to complex social
interactions.33
This paper will not deal with the difficult problem of how to adjudicate between
the competing norms and ideals that are a product of complex social interactions. However,
it does want to suggest that, once we settle on an ideal, knowing something about how
norms are generated through social interaction and what moral sentiments and intuitions
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have been generated through evolutionary activity would be a useful thing. This is because
these evolutionarily derived norms can either be harnessed to compliment and deepen our
commitment to the selected ideal and therefore provide part of the motive force for its
accomplishment, or they can actively work against it.
Suppose, for instance, that we judge it to be a good thing for those who love
each other to be able to get married and we progressively extend this right to include not
only homosexuals, but also polygamists, and even incestuous couples.34 If it is the case that
there is an evolved moral sentiment against such unions, then we would need to act to create
a social environment where this sentiment is less likely to be expressed and acted upon such
that it might result in discrimination against the incestuous couple (or triple!). This may
seem far-fetched, but disgust—a moral sentiment that is strongly suspected to be a product
of our pre-linguistic evolution35—is currently one of the main motivators for maintaining or
enlarging political discrimination against homosexuals, including marriage discrimination.36
Here, there is no evolutionary reason for us to be disgusted with homosexual acts, but the
capacity for moral disgust has informed a cultural history of attitudes and practices in
which, for various social and economic reasons, homosexuality came to be regarded as
increasingly contra-normative.
Leaving disgust and other evolutionarily derived hurdles and stumbling blocks
to the realization of our common goals aside, Stephen G. Morris in his article “The
Evolution of Cooperative Behavior and its Implications for Ethics” (2009) provides us with
an argument for how an evolutionarily derived moral capacity can be harnessed to realize
one of the goals that we hold in common. Given their evolutionary history, Morris
maintains, “a particular picture of human nature emerges—namely, that a person’s
propensity to behave cooperatively is positively cooperated with the degree to which that
individual is able to maintain a positive affective state.”37 Therefore, there is reason to
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suspect that, if we wish to make more people happy, then we should be concerned with
creating an environment in which there mare many opportunities for cooperative behavior.
To any reader familiar with the ethics of John Dewey and his views on human
nature, this paper’s thesis that those who are concerned with realizing their idea of the good
have much to learn from the natural sciences and that we must take evolved human nature
into account when we try to realize our ideal community is not surprising. Certainly, this
paper is Deweyan in inspiration and generally follows his recommendations for critical
inquiry into the ethical domain so as to best prepare ourselves for the successful realization
of our ethical ideals. To make it sound even more Deweyan, this paper supports a critical
inquiry into the history and causes of our present valuations and practices using the best
methods of the sciences and with the aim of understanding how these norms might create
tensions or problems. Further, it believes that, having undertaken this critical reflection, we
can then seek ways to adjust our norms and practices such that these tensions might be
overcome. Why then, if the paper’s conclusions are largely in agreement with Dewey’s
moral philosophy, do we need to update his ethis and to claim that this update represents
(part of) the future of ethics? The first reason is that many contemporary academic
philosophers are hostile to Dewey’s claim that our norms are the product of biological and
cultural evolution. Therefore, the argument needed to be made again, using current science,
in order that the field of ethics might benefit from the knowledge of these processes that
current science provides. The second reason is that, to the lay public, evolutionary moral
philosophy explains the way in which we act and suggests that, try as we might, we cannot
act any differently. By showing why and how our culture shapes these evolved moral
sentiments and does or does not allow them to be expressed, this public can be disabused of
the notion that it has no responsibility for its actions or that it cannot change the actions of
others because we “evolved to be like this.” The third reason to update Dewey is that
advances in evolutionary moral psychology have taught us something different about human
nature than Dewey believed to be the case. In works like Freedom and Culture and Does
Human Nature Change?. Dewey calls attention to the near infinite malleability of human
nature by culture and is very resistant to the idea that our brutishness or our cooperativeness
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might be more than the result of acculturation.38 However, evolutionary moral psychology
has strongly suggested that we have innate moral sentiments and that these leave us with
certain strong tendencies. Thus, if we wish to be faithful to Dewey and follow his logic of
inquiry rather than his conclusions, we should update our ethical practices to be cognizant of
this fact. Including it will allow us, in a naturalist and pragmatist fashion, to better
understand the possibilities of and means for achieving our ethical goals.
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